At a glance, a “pivot to Asia” seems far removed from Europe’s immediate security needs. The United States’ own pivot to Asia—underscored by the sudden withdrawal of about 700 US troops from NATO’s eastern flank and an ultimatum to Ukraine to make heavy concessions to Russia to end hostilities—has seemingly come once again at the expense of transatlantic security concerns.
While European policymakers committed to the Readiness 2030 initiative in response to the second Trump administration’s unpredictable stance towards NATO and Ukraine, the rearmament task at hand remains exceptionally daunting. The existing fragmentation of military procurement in Europe has exacerbated these problems, reducing interoperability between European militaries and increasing the costs of preparing Europe’s defences.
However, the United States’ pivot to Asia could function as a model for Europe’s rearmament program. Indeed, because of North Korea’s military deployments to Ukraine, Europe now shares more security concerns with South Korea and Japan despite their geographic distance.
Hence, South Korea and Japan could function as a production accelerator and high-end technological enabler (respectively) for Europe through the friendshoring of some of their defence industrial capabilities. By developing joint ventures in the co-production of munitions and “strategic enablers”, bolstering the resilience of defence industrial supply chains, and organizing research and development programs with South Korea and Japan, Europe could rearm at a much faster rate and at lower cost.
Even before the deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine, South Korea played an increasingly active role in supporting European security despite restrictions on arms exports. By late 2024, South Korea ranked as the second-largest arms supplier to NATO’s European members after the United States due to its consistent supply of artillery ammunition and vehicles. Subsequently, the EU and South Korea agreed to a Security and Defence Partnership enabling greater military industrial cooperation. South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung followed this by appointing a special envoy this year to oversee the negotiation of defence procurement projects totalling $56.2 billion.
Japan has similarly stepped up its security cooperation with Europe since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition to playing a key role in the G7’s responses to the invasion, Japan has joined the coalition of the willing to support Ukraine. Since then, the EU and Japan have begun discussions to deepen this collaboration through their own Security and Defence Partnership. Such collaboration is expected to increase with the expected partial lifting of Japan’s previous restrictions on arms exports under the new premiership of Takaichi Sanae.
Nevertheless, these initiatives between Europe, South Korea, and Japan have taken a siloed approach. This is a mistake, as Europe can benefit from the growing defence linkages between South Korea and Japan, and vice versa. Notably, as part of the ongoing overall improvement in South Korea-Japan bilateral relations, Lee and Takaichi have prioritized the monitoring of North Korea’s alliance with Russia and committed to cooperating on developing AI, unmanned defence systems, and aerospace, bucking previous trends of South Korean-Japanese diplomatic disputes.
In this context, Europe could offer mutually beneficial defence industrial opportunities for South Korea and Japan as well. Europe’s own defence industrial needs synergize with South Korea’s desire to increase its global arms exports and Japan’s push to revitalize its own flagging defence industries. South Korea has a comparative advantage in the scale and speed at which it can produce artillery, armour, and munitions, which opens arms imports and co-production opportunities to help Europe build its arms stockpiles. At the same time, Japan’s relative technological edge in sensors and electronics, satellite defences, and the production of sub-components in military drones will ensure the strength of Europe’s air defences. This will be especially vital for the development of Europe’s drone wall.
This is not to say that South Korea and Japan can become pillars in Europe’s rearmament though. Europe’s geographic distance from East Asia alone prevents a total integration of their military industrial bases.
A more realistic goal would accordingly be the foundation of trilateral defence industrial arrangements. This would entail the establishment of trilateral ventures to co-produce defence technologies, insulate defence industrial supply chains from potential external shocks through creating supply chain redundancies, and pooling resources for research and development programs.
Such programs should emphasize the production of artillery, munitions, and vehicles and promote innovations in missile and drone defences and cybersecurity. European factories would then be able to scale up their production of shells and vehicles built from Korean designs, while projects to innovate military equipment, like missiles and drones, can benefit from Japanese electronic warfare capabilities.
Such initiatives with South Korea and Japan would be highly effective in expediting and lowering the costs of Europe’s rearmament. Thus, instead of leaving South Korea and Japan’s rapprochement as afterthoughts in its own defence industrial strategy, Europe must recognize their joint potential in actualizing Europe’s rearmament beyond mere promises.