“Securing Our Future” London Summit on Ukraine (Copyright European Union 2025 / Photography by Christophe Licoppe)
When US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin excluded European leaders from negotiations to end Russo-Ukrainian hostilities, a bitter reality set in for Europe: for the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949, the United States wanted to abdicate its traditional leadership role in the alliance. Diplomatic incidents like Trump’s tirade against Zelensky and the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine have only validated such fears, even if US military aid to Ukraine was restored and Ukrainian and US officials later agreed to involve European partners in the Russo-Ukrainian peace process.
In response, European leaders gathered in emergency summits in Paris, London, and Brussels to deliberate on how to maintain their support for Ukraine. Despite how these summits fell short of guaranteeing Ukraine’s security with troop deployments, the London summit resulted in the formation of a UK, French, and Ukrainian-led “coalition of the willing” to support a just and viable peace agreement for Ukraine. To better guarantee Ukraine’s security while the United States reevaluates its support for NATO, European leaders should additionally push for the creation of the European Security Council (ESC), a forum that would strengthen NATO’s “European pillar” and serve as a critical platform for European defence coordination.
The ESC’s primary purpose should be to enhance Europe’s self-reliance in its own security, which currently entails coordinating defence spending, developing credible security guarantees for Ukraine, and reducing European dependence on US military support. Such a framework would additionally empower European states to respond assertively to regional crises, ranging from Russian aggression to destabilizing threats in the Balkans and North Africa.
Notably, the idea to form the ESC is not new either, first gaining traction in 2019 in response to the first Trump administration’s constant derision of NATO as an enabler of European “freeloading” off of the US military presence in Europe. Supporters of the concept included French President Emmanuel Macron and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, but their enthusiasm waned when the subsequent administration of Joe Biden brought a renewed Atlanticist approach to US foreign policy.
However, the second Trump administration’s decreasing interest in European security underscores the urgent need for the ESC, especially as existing NATO, EU, and Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decision-making bodies often struggle to respond to crises fast enough due to their size and cumbersome procedures. The ESC would instead complement them by offering a streamlined format for NATO’s European members to build coalitions of the willing and generate consensus on security policies that NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE could later adopt.
To avoid duplicating the functions of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, the ESC should strike a balance between inclusivity and efficiency. Taking inspiration from the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the European Council, the ESC should be widely representative of Europe’s geopolitical diversity. A 13-member structure would be a pragmatic starting point, with five core members serving staggered five-year terms and eight supporting members serving staggered two-year terms. Prospective membership should be open to all European NATO countries with elections to seats held annually, except for incumbent core and supporting members, who should be barred from running for immediate re-election to prevent structural stagnation and provide opportunities for others to participate in the ESC. Non-European NATO allies like the United States and Canada, major non-NATO European allies like Ukraine, neutral European states like Ireland and Switzerland, and relevant NATO, European Commission, European Council, and OSCE officials should participate in discussions as non-voting observers when appropriate.
The ESC should likewise avoid the pitfalls of permanent membership, veto power, and the requirement for unanimous decision-making that have sometimes pushed the UNSC and European Council into gridlock in moments of crisis. ESC decision-making should accordingly be based on majority voting with no veto powers for core members, ensuring an efficient voting mechanism that will better position the ESC to formulate decisive responses to emerging crises.
Ironically, a robust European security framework might also incentivize continued US involvement in NATO. This is because the ESC would enable Europe to be more self-reliant, thereby assuming more of the burden of collective defence and addressing Trump’s longstanding criticisms of European “freeloading.”
Thus, as the United States reconsiders its global commitments, Europe should see this moment as an opportunity to adjust its own security architecture and take a stronger stance in its own defences. The ESC can address the continent’s security needs by being a streamlined, representative, and action-oriented policy platform adjacent to NATO, EU, and OSCE structures where European states can remain proactive, aligned, and resilient in the face of emerging threats. Through the ESC, European states will be more self-reliant in supporting peace and security in the region.